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Homicide Rates and Mortality Trends:
Perspectives from Public-Health Scholarship
Jeffrey S. Adler
More than three decades ago, Eric H. Monkkonen celebrated the creative fragmentation of criminal-justice history1. He compared the field, which 
was then in its infancy, to U.S. urban history and noted that the latter had quickly 
become inward-looking as a consequence of a rush to synthesize exciting new 
findings. The great methodological and theoretical promise of 1960s and 1970s urban 
mobility studies dominated the field, making it increasingly narrow as historian after 
historian reproduced the core approaches and perspectives. By contrast, according 
to Monkkonen, criminal justice history remained dynamic, adapting methods and 
theories from a wide range of disciplines and examining a broad spectrum of themes. 
Historians of crime, for example, employed both qualitative and quantitative methods 
and published their work in disparate publication outlets within subfields of history 
and across myriad disciplinary lines.
The years since Monkkonen’s jeremiad have confirmed his judgment. The field’s 
intellectual diversity and disciplinary fragmentation have yielded rich, innovative 
scholarship. Resisting methodological and theoretical orthodoxies, criminal justice 
historians have continued to embrace new approaches, challenge the conventional 
wisdom, ask novel questions, draw from wide-ranging theoretical perspectives, 
and publish in journals scattered across the scholarly landscape. My own work on 
the history of crime in the United States, for instance, has borrowed from fields 
ranging from evolutionary psychology to neurophysiology and has appeared in 
legal, criminology, sociology, and history journals as well as in books published by 
university presses.
Such intellectual and disciplinary diversity notwithstanding, much of the 
scholarship in the field has drawn from the social sciences – particularly sociology, 
criminology, and social psychology – or from literary theory and cultural analysis. 
Historians of violence, for example, have made especially effective use of 
methodological approaches and theoretical frameworks pioneered by social scientists, 
such as Norbert Elias, Roger Gould, Marvin Wolfgang, Gary LaFree, and Martin 
Daly and Margo Wilson2. Constructing massive, detailed data sets using case-level 
sources, historians of homicide have analyzed who committed illegal acts, who were 
the victims, and how these patterns changed over time3. Their studies have identified 
the demographic backgrounds of those involved in crime and the social and cultural 
triggers for criminal violence, all the while charting shifts across space and over time.
1  Monkkonen (1986, p.1146-1157).
2  Elias (1939, repr, 1994); Gould (2003); Wolfgang (1958); LaFree (1998); Daly and Wilson (1988).
3  For example, see Monkkonen (2001); Adler (2006); Roth (2009).
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Recent scholarship from another corner of the academic world, however, 
holds additional promise for criminal-justice historians, not to replace established 
frameworks but to supplement and complement them. Research from public-health 
economists and demographers offers particularly important, fresh insights for 
historians of crime. Rather than relying on the case-level research more commonly 
employed by social historians of crime, public-health scholarship typically focuses 
on macro-level analyses, and therefore these studies can suggest perspectives and 
explanations beyond our usual ken. One example, drawn from my current research, 
may illustrate the potential contribution from public-health scholarship.
Trends in American violent crime during the interwar period, particularly the 
1930s, have puzzled historians. The homicide rate in the United States surged during 
the 1920s, rising by 17.9 percent4. The increase in lethal violence was especially 
pronounced early in the decade and in major urban centers. Between 1920 and 1925, 
for instance, Chicago’s homicide rate jumped by 94.8 percent, New Orleans’s by 
132.7 percent, St. Louis’s by 57.1 percent, Detroit’s by 42.0 percent, Baltimore’s by 
60.0 percent, and Rochester’s by 94.1 percent5. In most American cities, the rate of 
such violence peaked during the mid-to-late 1920s.
A blend of demographic, cultural, and social forces likely accounted for the 
sharp rise in homicide during the 1920s. The return of soldiers after World War One 
and high levels of migration, especially by African American fleeing the South and 
resettling in the industrial centers of the American North, produced imbalanced sex 
ratios, roiled domestic relations, fueled racism, and contributed to social turmoil, 
which sometimes turned violent. Prohibition and the expansion of criminal networks 
added to the death toll as well, though popular culture has wildly exaggerated this 
source of violence6.
Far more perplexing for criminal-justice historians, however, are the 1930s, for 
American homicide (as well as lethal violence in much of western Europe) plummeted 
during the Great Depression. Between 1929, when the U.S. stock-market crash 
triggered the economic crisis, and 1940, the American homicide rate plunged by 29.5 
percent, despite the skyrocketing unemployment rates and soaring levels of poverty7. 
In U.S. cities, lethal violence fell even more dramatically. Chicago’s homicide rate 
dipped by 33.1 percent, Detroit’s by 66.3 percent, New Orleans’s by 56.6 percent, 
New York City’s by 41.8 percent, Pittsburgh’s by 61.0 percent, and Birmingham’s by 
46.0 percent. For the interwar period, lethal violence hit its low-water mark in 1939 or 
1940 in Chicago, Detroit, New Orleans, Memphis, Birmingham, New York City, and 
many other cities, even though roughly one-sixth of workers remained unemployed8.
Such a trend confounds our understanding of the triggers for violence. Social 
scientists typically associate poverty with increasing social conflict, welling group 
4  Eckberg (2006, p.239).
5  The homicide and mortality rate data discussed in this essay, unless otherwise noted, comes from the 
U.S. government’s annual publication of the Vital Statistics of the United States: Mortality Statistics, 
21-41 (1922-1943). 
6  Boudouris (1974, p.532); Monkkonen (2001, p.203).
7  Eckberg (2006, p.239).
8  Hosen (1992, p.257).
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tensions, and rising levels of family turmoil9. Yet, during the deepest, longest 
economic crisis in U.S. history, lethal violence spiraled downward.
Historians have noted but not explained this counter-intuitive pattern, in which 
violence soared during the prosperous 1920s and then plunged during the Great 
Depression10. The 1930s trend is, needless to say, particularly vexing. Just as gangland 
violence did not account for the increase in lethal violence, the end of Prohibition did 
not produce the huge dip in homicide during the Great Depression, for the drop in 
homicide began long before the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution in 1933.
Two scholars have recently attempted to make sense of the surprising relationship 
between American violence and the Great Depression. The criminologist Barry Latzer 
describes the sharp fall in homicide during the 1930s and speculates that perhaps the 
surge in poverty simply exerted little effect on violent behavior, which is typically 
“unaffected by economic downturns or upswings.”11 But he also observes that 
homicide rates tumbled during other hard times, such as the 1890s, and soared during 
prosperous decades, including the 1920s and the 1960s12. The historian Randolph 
Roth offers a provocative explanation for the drop in American violence during the 
Great Depression. Roth suggests that Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s calming influence 
re-established confidence in government and the legitimacy of the social order, which, 
in turn, tamped down lethal violence13. In most American cities, however, homicide 
rates began to fall many years before 1933, when FDR became president. Between 
1929, when the Great Depression began, and 1933, New Orleans’s homicide rate 
had already plunged by 34.8 percent, Detroit’s by 31.9 percent, Baltimore’s by 22.3 
percent, and Philadelphia’s by 23.9 percent. Moreover, the drop in African American 
homicide accounted for the lion’s share of the overall decrease in the level of violence 
in cities such as New Orleans14. Yet increasingly oppressive Jim Crow measures had 
nearly completely disfranchised African American New Orleanians; only 0.8 percent 
were registered to vote when Roosevelt entered the White House, and by 1940 the 
figure had fallen to 0.3 percent, making it unlikely that the president’s “Fireside 
Chats” restored African Americans’ “faith in the country” and hence reduced lethal 
violence in the city15.
If not the soothing voice of Roosevelt, why did homicide plummet in the United 
States during the Great Depression? Case-level data provide no obvious explanations. 
To the contrary, a statistical analysis of killers and victims during the interwar period 
reveals little change; the same kinds of people committed (and were victims of) 
9  For example, see Fishback et al. (2007, p.10); Stansfield et al. (2017, p.61).
10  Gurr (1989, p.41-43); Loftin et al. (1989, p.171); Zahn (1989, p.219-22); Monkkonen (2001, p.17);  
Lane (1997, p.248).
11  Latzer (2014).
12  Latzer (2016, p.44).
13  Roth (2009, p.440-441).
14  The figures and descriptions of homicide in New Orleans come from my data set, compiled from 
police and coroners reports on every New Orleans homicide, court records, penitentiary files, news-
paper accounts of crime, and other sources. The data set includes 2118 cases.
15  Roth (2009, p.441); Tyler (1996, p.28). Nor would Roosevelt’s calming words explain the 1930s 
drop in homicide in much of western Europe.
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lethal violence during the flush years of the 1920s and during the deep depression 
of the 1930s. New Orleans data illustrates this continuity16. The city’s homicide rate 
tumbled by more than half from 1929 until 1940. Between the good times of the 
1920s and the lean years of the Great Depression, the proportion of killers who were 
African American changed by less than 1 percent; the proportion of victims who 
were African American varied by less than 2 percent; the proportion of killers with 
low-blue-collar jobs fluctuated by 3 percent; the proportion of killers who were men 
shifted by 3 percent; the percentage of homicides occurring in the home changed by 
less than 1 percent; and the proportion of assailants who killed acquaintances varied 
by 1 percent. Simply put, while the rate of lethal violence plunged, roughly the same 
people in the same settings killed, though they did so significantly less often than 
before. Why, then, did American violence drop as the U.S. economy tanked?
Public-health researchers have explored these paradoxical patterns and have shed 
intriguing light on the steep rise and then sharp fall in American homicide during the 
interwar period. In analyzing the effects of short-term economic changes on mortality 
trends, these economists and demographers have discovered that lethal violence 
tends to be “procyclical.” In other words, homicide typically rises when the economy 
grows and falls when it contracts17.
But homicide rates, according to these researchers, did not shift in isolation. 
Rather, lethal violence varied with overall mortality, which is also procyclical. Death 
rates, including homicide rates, tend to increase in good economic times and decrease 
during hard times. When labor markets tighten, mortality rises, while death rates for 
eight of the ten leading causes of mortality decrease when labor markets languish18. 
One study concluded that a “one point increase in unemployment reduces predicted 
mortality from motor vehicle crashes, other accidents, and homicides by 3.0, 1.6, 
and 1.9 percent respectively”19. Early twentieth-century demographic data confirm 
this counter-intuitive pattern. During the Great Depression Americans were healthier, 
lived longer, grew taller, and less often died from disease, accidents, and homicide 
than during the flush times of the previous decade. Between 1929 and 1940, the U.S. 
unemployment rate leaped by 356.3 percent, and from 1931 to 1940 it never dipped 
below 14.3 percent20. Yet life expectancy climbed by 5.8 years21. During the worst 
years of the depression, the proportion of Americans with annual incomes below $150 
nearly quadrupled, though life expectancy jumped by more than five years22. The 
height of men reaching maturity rose by almost two centimeters during the 1930s23.
Urban mortality data for the 1930s provide additional evidence. Homicides, 
which comprised roughly 1 percent of all deaths in American cities during the Great 
Depression, fell more sharply than overall mortality but followed precisely the same 
16  No city was “representative” of national trends, though New Orleans followed the same trends as 
other major urban centers and similar patterns as the nation overall.
17  Ruhm (2000, p.632); Ruhm (2005, p.341); Granados (2005, p.1195-1196); Adda et al.(2009, p.1386).
18  Ruhm (2000, p.617); Gerdthman and Ruhm (2006, p.299).
19  Ruhm (2000, p.632). The two outliers are suicide and cancer.
20  Hosen (1992, p.257).
21  Hosen (1992, p.252).
22  Perrott and Collins (1934, p.219); Granados and Diex Roux, (2009, p.17290).
23  Fogel (2004, p.37).
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trend. Between 1929 and 1940, Detroit’s homicide rate plunged by two-thirds, while 
the city’s mortality rate fell by 23.9 percent. In New York City, homicide dropped 
by nearly half and mortality by 10 percent, and in Memphis, the lethal violence rate 
dipped by 55.5 percent, while mortality fell by 21.7 percent. In short, the decreasing 
rate of homicide during the Great Depression occurred as a part of a wider, larger 
drop in death rates, suggesting that the dip in lethal violence was somehow related to 
the fall in mortality from other causes24.
Public-health researchers recognize that correlation is not causation, and they 
do not argue that people lived longer, grew taller, became healthier, and butchered 
one another less frequently because they were suddenly penniless, jobless, and 
homeless25. Nonetheless, such sustained procyclicality, supported by an analysis of 
interwar death rates but also nearly a century of data, suggests that changes in overall 
mortality rates might offer clues about fluctuations in homicide rates26.
Armed with considerable quantitative evidence supporting their procyclicality 
model, economists and demographers speculate that spikes in poverty and short-term 
surges in unemployment change peoples’ lifestyles in ways that reduce myriad forms 
of premature death, including homicide27. Numerous studies demonstrate that alcohol 
consumption, particularly by heavy drinkers, rises in good times and falls when the 
economy falters and people have less money to spend on beer and whiskey28. Data 
on cirrhosis deaths support this view29. In New Orleans between 1920 and 1929, 
despite Prohibition, the city’s cirrhosis death rate rose by 25.1 percent. Yet from 
1929 to 1940, the rate fell by 34.7 percent, even though Prohibition ended in 1933. 
Inebriation was also a contributing factor to a wide variety of violent crimes, ranging 
from saloon brawls to wife beating. Thus, the public-health scholarship on alcohol 
consumption and economic change may help to explain the spike in homicide during 
the booming 1920s and the drop during the 1930s.
Closely related, the dearth of disposable income during the Great Depression 
probably discouraged raucous leisure activities. Street life likely became quieter, 
and, in fact, lethal violence on the streets of New Orleans plunged by 49.9 percent 
between 1929 and 1940. Similarly, motor-vehicle deaths decrease when the economy 
contracts. People drive less and are less likely to drive while intoxicated, as recently 
scholarship has noted30. In New Orleans, the automobile-fatality rate dropped by 28.0 
percent during the Great Depression. Other forms of accidental death follow (and 
followed) the same pattern. Between 1929 and 1940, the rate of (non-vehicular) accidental 
death fell by 29.9 percent in New Orleans. During hard times people appear to be more 
24  No shifts in medical treatment or trauma care account for this pattern.
25  Gerdtham and Ruhm (2006, p.314).
26  Granados (2005, p.1196); Ruhm (2015). In some ways, the historian Roger Lane’s insightful analysis 
of violent death in nineteenth-century Philadelphia anticipated such a pattern. See Lane (1979).
27  Ruhm (2005, p.1209); Lin et al. (1995, p.531); Adda et al. (2009, p.1391).
28  Lin et al.  (1995, p.535); Granados and Diex Roux (2009, p.17293); Ruhm (2005, p.1209); Ruhm and 
Black (2002, p.660).
29  To be sure, cirrhosis death rates offer an imperfect measure of alcohol consumption, though the pattern is 
revealing and consistent with more precise recent studies of the effects of economic forces on drinking.
30   Ruhm (2000, p. 621); Ruhm and Black (2002, p. 660); Gerdtham and Ruhm (2006, p. 301); Lin et al. 
(1995, p. 535).
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cautious, drowning, falling off balconies, and tumbling down stairs less frequently.
Migration is also sensitive to economic trends and procyclical31. Compared with 
the boom times of the 1920s, the flow of newcomers to American cities dropped 
sharply during the 1930s. As a consequence, crowding decreased, sex ratios balanced 
and the proportion of young, single men – the group most responsible for lethal 
violence – contracted in American urban centers. Older and more stable populations 
proved to be less volatile and less homicidal as migration waned.
If Americans had little disposable income to spend on leisure activities, socializing, 
and consumer goods, perhaps this affected the way that they resolved conflict, and 
perhaps it influenced violent death just as it altered trends in accidental death and 
overall mortality. As they became relatively poorer during the Great Depression, 
Americans appear to have used firearms less than during the 1920s, for gun violence 
in interwar America was procyclical. It surged when the economy expanded and 
plummeted when it contracted. During the 1920s, firearms violence exploded. But, 
with the high rates of poverty and unemployment after 1929 and therefore less 
disposable income, poorer Americans may have been less able to afford guns, just 
as they were less able to purchase alcohol and automobiles. Scattered evidence 
suggests that handguns became more expensive during the 1930s, when income 
fell32. It seems plausible that fewer people, particularly young and poor Americans, 
could afford these weapons, and quantitative evidence provides strong evidence of 
such a procyclical shift. Gun homicide in the United States dropped precipitously 
during the Great Depression33. New Orleans sources permit a fine-grained analysis of 
this change. During the flush 1920s, the city’s firearm homicide rate leaped by 45.3 
percent, whereas it fell by 64.1 percent during the Great Depression. In fact, the drop 
in gun homicide accounted for nearly all of the decrease in New Orleans’s homicide 
rate during the 1929-1940 period. Furthermore the variance in gun homicide, like 
the fluctuations in overall mortality in the city, was particularly pronounced among 
African American residents, who committed two-thirds of local homicides. During 
the 1920s, the African American firearm homicide rate soared by 191.9 percent. But, 
from the start of the depression until the eve of World War I, New Orleans’s African 
American gun homicide rate plunged by 80.8 percent, tracking race-based changes 
in overall mortality rates.
In short, economic trends correlated with patterns of overall mortality rates and 
with shifts in gun violence in interwar America, suggesting that the hard times that 
reduced drinking, driving, and other high-risk behavior may have limited access to 
firearms, contributing to the drop in lethal violence that paralleled the fall in the rate 
of accidental death and alcohol-related mortality. Even if the same kinds of people in 
the same sorts of social circumstances killed in the 1930s as in the 1920s, during the 
Great Depression violence less often involved firearms and hence the rate of lethality 
dropped, as broken noses, cracked ribs, and knife injuries replaced deadly gunshot 
wounds. The economic crisis of the 1930s, in other words, may have indirectly 
reduced early death – from disease and accidents but also from homicide.
31  Ruhm (2000, p.619).
32  New Orleans police larceny reports indicate that the value of handguns stolen during the 1930s was  
significantly higher than the comparable figure for the 1920s. Such data is not definitive, though it is 
suggestive.
33  Wintemute (1987, p.533). 
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With its focus on wider, macro-level trends, public-health scholarship may 
help to explain shifts in crime that can be obscured or masked by case-level data 
analysis. Thus, the combination of a public-health approach to lethal violence and 
the more familiar methods employed by criminal justice historians may shed light 
on the mysterious drop in homicide during the Great Depression – and changes in 
crime during other upswings and downturns in the economy. Likewise, public-health 
scholarship on the long-term effects of exposure to violence or on the biochemical 
impact of stress or on the impact of “community efficacy” on the ecology of violence 
could provide historians with fresh approaches to a wide range of research questions. 
Sometimes criminal-justice historians can find new insights in unlikely places, such 
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